Introduction
'The question when it is right to invoke an equitable right in a commercial context is not always easy to resolve.'
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In 1516, St Thomas More's Utopia was published, with Holdsworth noting that at the time of its writing:
New countries, new nations, new phenomena of all kinds were emerging. With these things the old learning, the old modes of thought and reasoning were powerless to deal. These things must be investigated; and the results of that investigation necessarily led to the abandonment of old theories.
what are the fundamental principles-often takes place discreetly under the cloak of contextneutrality. Such a tacit yet paradigmatic shift risks undervaluing the importance of equitable doctrine and bypassing the need for transparent reasoning.
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Further, as with More's influence on the Chancery as an institution, we argue that an appreciation of the views of particular Justices in the Supreme Court as to equity is crucial to an understanding of the development of the law, and the normative choices involved. This article therefore offers a critical analysis of contemporary developments of equity not only by reference to principle, but also by considering the influence of the particular judges and the methods employed. Presently, the place of equity in commerce is not at risk; if anything, it is the core of the equitable principles that are in jeopardy.
Judges, Commerce and Equity
Holdsworth had high praise for More, whose 'beautiful character would have made him an ideal Chancellor at any time '. 12 Similarly, Holdsworth viewed the appointment of More as
'an important turning-point in the history of equity', 13 because More rationalised and brought coherence to the operation of the relevant principles, and restored 'harmonious relations between the court of Chancery and the common law courts for the next half a century'. 14 More's Chancellorship was thus transformative.
The assessment of Supreme Court decisions below highlights the influence of certain Justices on the recent developments. Notable contributors appear to be Lord Neuberger PSC (a Chancery judge), Lord Sumption JSC and Lord Mance JSC (commercial lawyers by background). There is no requirement that the Supreme Court should have a particular complement of Chancery lawyers, with the only statutory requirement that 'between them the judges will have knowledge of, and experience of practice in, the law of each part of the the provision which is to be construed'; ZX Tan, 'Beyond the real and the paper deal: the quest for contextual coherence in contractual interpretation ' (2016) 11 See further Sir Anthony Mason, 'The place of equity and equitable remedies in the contemporary common law world ' (1994) 110 LQR 238 and Lord Millett, 'Equity's place in the law of commerce ' (1998) Neuberger is the only Chancery specialist currently serving on the Court, albeit that Lord Carnwath served in the Chancery Division when in the High Court, but as his Lordship has conceded, his practice at the Bar had principally been in planning and local government law. 18 In addition, Lord Collins has occasionally returned as an ad hoc judge since his retirement to assist in such cases. 19 As we shall see below in Section 4, even Lord Neuberger has changed his mind on key issues, As his Lordship has said (speaking of himself in the third person, as he did in FHR): 'Lord Neuberger is not on his own when it comes to judicial tergiversations on the issue of a principal's proprietary interests in his agent's bribe. His volte-face is by no means an exception in what is seen by some as the placid waters of equity'. 20 We argue that this lack of specialist Chancery expertise has seen the Supreme Court's equity jurisprudence take a more commercial turn. The days are past when commercial lawyers might fear their cases in the highest cases being decided by a 'Chancery lawyer often regarded as somewhat unbending'. 21 To an extent, these arguments relate to questions of fusion, and AIB, for example, is replete with references to the fusion debate. 22 Australian judges have long debated the development of equitable principles, particularly with the influence on legal thinking of late adoption of the Judicature Act 23 fusion in New South Wales. 24 This is not the place to reopen those wounds, beyond noting that the debate has been particularly vigorous in the commercial context. 25 But we may note that the issues examined below are thrown into relief, and into the courts, by the increased willingness in recent years of lawyers for commercial actors to invoke the utility of equitable concepts as ways of avoiding statutory or common law rules relating to insolvency, limitation, and causation. Below, we consider the judicial responses to these attempted innovations -sometimes the court removes established distinctions between damages at law and compensation in equity, 26 or avoids fine distinctions (as in FHR). 27 The point was well made by Sir Anthony Mason:
The rise of the modem commercial economy… has raised in an acute form important issues concerning the extension and application of equitable doctrines and principles. That is because trusts are created in commercial settings and commercial transactions are so structured that they provide scope for the creation of relationships recognised in equity, with consequences for proprietary remedies and for third parties.
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The inventiveness of equity has been exploited by lawyers seeking advantage in commercial litigation, and that poses challenges.
The development of English commercial law owes, of course, a great debt to another great judge Lord Mansfield, and in his best endeavours in this field, drew on both common law and equity. As Hanbury observed:
In the field of commercial law, equity missed its chances of capturing a large jurisdiction owing to the scheme of incorporating that topic into the common law which, it is not too much to say, formed the chief life-work of Lord Mansfield. That great judge, however, had a mind strongly imbued with equitable doctrine, and was reported to have said on one occasion that he never liked common law so well as when it resembled equity. The commercial law, therefore, which he converted into common law, tends to be somewhat coloured by equity, and in certain important branches of it equity has gained a very strong foothold.
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Our critique here is not framed in terms of common law versus equity, except insofar as the common law position is preferred as part of the court's commercialist common sense approach. 30 It is our contention that in the current period, albeit not necessarily in as 25 commercial law is colouring the law of equity.
Our study also has significant implications for the balance of expertise on the Supreme Court. Six vacancies will arise on the Court before the end of 2018, 32 and several of those retiring Justices are those who have played key roles in the cases considered here (Lords Neuberger, Mance, Toulson and Sumption). The Court has announced that it will hold the two joint selection exercises to appoint three Justices in each round. This approach followed a review of the appointments process by Jenny Rowe, the former Chief Executive of the Court, 33 and seeks to encourage applicants from a diverse range of backgrounds and specialisms. 34 The trend of the recent Supreme Court decisions on equity re-emphasises the need for Chancery expertise amongst the Justices.
Compensatory Liability for Breach of Trust (a) One Law of Trusts or Two?
In Target Browne-Wilkinson said that the basic rule is that the beneficiary is entitled to compensation for losses that are suffered but for the breach. 37 Relevantly, the specialist rule of reconstitution of the trust fund does not apply in the context of a commercial bare trust once the underlying transaction has been completed. 38 In his view, the rationale of reconstitution-'no one beneficiary is entitled to the trust property and the need to compensate all beneficiaries for the trust' 39 -is irrelevant for cases like Target Holdings.
The proposed binary classification of basic and specialist principles has the potential to change the content of trust law fundamentally. Traditionally, equity caters for a range of different breaches, distinguishing between cases of misapplication of trust assets and cases involving lack of prudence and diligence on the part of the trustee. In equitable parlance, the liability flows from the trustee's primary duty to account for his stewardship. 40 Where there is a misapplication of trust assets, the beneficiary can choose to falsify the account: 41 the unauthorised disbursement would be disallowed, giving rise to a shortfall in the trust estate that the trustee becomes liable to make good, either in specie or by paying the monetary equivalent. The objective of the falsified account is to provide the substitutive performance of the obligation, that is to say, to treat the misapplied assets as being still in the trust fund.
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Causation between loss and breach is therefore irrelevant. On the other hand, where the trustee has, through the lack of diligence or prudence, caused loss to the trust fund, the beneficiary can surcharge the account. As the surcharging of account has a reparative aim, causation between breach and loss is relevant to the monetary liability derived therefrom.
Target Holdings concerned a misapplication of trust funds by the conveyancing solicitors who held the monies on trust for the lender pending completion of the mortgage transaction. Contrary to the lender's instructions, the solicitors paid away the funds to the borrower without obtaining the required security, although the security was executed a month later. Lord Browne-Wilkinson held that the transaction was 'completed', and the lenderbeneficiary was therefore not entitled to reconstitution of the trust fund. However, in Youyang v Minter Ellison Morris Fletcher, the High Court of Australia explicitly disagreed with such a context-based application of remedial principles. 43 Whilst much criticism has been directed at the commercial and non-commercial divide, 44 less attention has been paid to the corollary 'basic' and 'specialist' distinction in The 'rewriting' of trust law is facilitated by the equitable accounting rules descending into neglect historically owing to changes in practice 45 -most notably, the rise of the terminology of 'equitable compensation', which replaced the language of accounting. The differentiation between the awards derived from falsification and surcharging of accounts respectively became obscured as a result. Target Holdings exemplifies the increasingly common practice of the courts assessing equitable compensation without reference to the accounting rules. The controversial reasoning of Target Holdings-at least, to equity traditionalists-led to a proliferation of modern scholarship on the equitable account, 46 much of which is written with the hope of fully reviving them in practice to bring about clarity to the law of equitable compensation for breach of trust. 47 But these efforts failed to persuade. In the landmark case of AIB, the UK Supreme Court affirmed that the basic principle is this: equitable compensation serves a reparative function-it is available for losses suffered but for the breach of duty.
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AIB arose from a commercial remortgage transaction. AIB advanced £3.3m to the solicitors to hold on trust pending completion. The solicitors were instructed to redeem the existing charge over the borrowers' home in favour of Barclays Bank out of the advance, obtain a first charge over the property in favour of AIB and then release the remaining funds to the borrowers. In breach of trust, the solicitors failed to transfer sufficient money to Barclays Bank to fully redeem the existing charge-the shortfall being approximately 45 Justice Edelman (extra-judicially), 'An English misturning with equitable compensation' (UNSWAustralia colloquium on equitable compensation and disgorgement of profit, 7-8 August 2015), available at: http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/publications/judges-speeches/justice-edelman/edelman-j-201508 (accessed at 7 June 2016). 46 See, for example, Lord Millett, 'Equity's place in the law of commerce ' (1998) £309,000. This resulted in excessive funding being released to the borrowers. AIB managed to obtain a second charge over the property in pursuance to negotiations with Barclays Bank. The borrowers subsequently defaulted. Owing to the prevailing depressed market conditions, the property was sold for only £1.2m. After paying off £309,000 that was due to Barclays Bank, AIB only obtained £867,697. It then sued the solicitors for approximately £2.5m, being the difference between the loan and the amount it recovered from the sale.
The Supreme Court unanimously found in favour of the solicitors, ruling that AIB was only entitled to £275,000, being the loss it suffered by comparison with what it would have received had there been no breach. Affirming Target Holdings, both Lord Reed and Lord Toulson were of the view that English law had clearly moved on from the days of equitable account. 49 Equitable compensation was to be derived from moving from the breach of duty directly to the remedy, without reference to the accounting principles. 50 In Lord Toulson's view, the falsification of account is simply a legal 'fairy tale'. Pelling QC, citing Lord Toulson's judgment, interpreted AIB as being 'concerned with the measure of equitable compensation for breach of trust that applies where there has been a breach of a bare trust arising in the context of a commercial contract to which the trustee and beneficiary are parties'. 59 He thus commented that equitable compensation should be the same as if contractual damages are sought only in cases where there is an underlying contract. 60 On such an interpretation, equitable compensation would be assessed differently where there is no underlying contract, thereby giving rise to two sets of compensatory principles for breach of trust.
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The unacknowledged (or unappreciated) development of two sets of equitable principles is potentially dangerous, though not unprecedented. 62 It is dangerous because the adaptation of equitable principles in response to the commercial context has occurred without proper justification and is discreetly being passed off as part of the general principles. Whilst the common law (in its broad sense of judge-made law, including equity) envisages the incremental development of its principles over the course of time, such progressive changes are to take place by way of transparent and sound reasoning. Taking a chronological overview of the evolution of remedial principles for breach of trust, we see the initial equal and co-existence of falsification and surcharging of accounts in the days of equitable account, which later evolved to the bifurcation between the basic principle (compensation) and the specialist principle (reconstitution) in Target Holdings and finally arriving at just compensation for breach of trust in AIB. It may be said the commercial context-from which the disputes in both Target Holdings and AIB arose-is a key driver of the emergence of the equitable compensatory principle for breach of trust. The contract, from which the commercial trust arose in Target Holdings and AIB, fortified the analogical bridge between equitable compensation for breach of trust and damages for breach of contract. 63 The court's attention was intensely focused on the bigger picture of performance of the transaction, as opposed to the specific snapshot of custodianship provided by the trust institution in the transactional process. In AIB, Lord Reed reflected thus:
(b) Equitable Compensation and the Trustee's Obligation
As the case law on equitable compensation develops, however, the reasoning supporting the assessment of compensation can be seen more clearly to reflect an analysis of the characteristics of the particular obligation breached. This increase in transparency permits greater scope for developing rules which are coherent with those adopted in the common law.
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The golden victory of the equitable compensatory principle, however, has profound implications for the contemporary content of a trustee's obligations. That a bare trust is employed as part of the machinery of the trust does not alter the bare trustee's obligation, like the obligations of trustees in traditional trusts, to 'get the trust property in, protect it, and vindicate the rights attaching to it'. 65 The traditional falsification of account arises from the acknowledgement of the trustee's custodianship: conceptually, a falsified account creates an immediate 'debt' between the trustee and the beneficiary in the value of the misapplied assets. 66 This explains the reference to an 'equitable debt' in older English cases. In AIB,
Lord Toulson, seemingly with little appreciation of the underlying conceptual significance, hastily concluded that the terminology had been replaced by the vocabulary of 'equitable compensation'. 67 The English abolition of the accounting rules-in particular, the falsification of account-is silently reforming the core obligation of trusteeship. More generally, as we argue here, it is symptomatic of a primacy of commercialist pragmatism in the Supreme Court's reasoning. Quite clearly, the Supreme Court's objective in AIB was to 63 The compensatory principle in contract law has been recently affirmed on numerous occasions: We now move on to examine the Supreme Court's reasoning in FHR, a landmark judgment not only for the issue it resolved but also for how it was resolved, most remarkably, by way of Lord Neuberger's unexplained desertion of his own previous opinion.
Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Proprietary Relief for Unauthorised Benefits (a) Constructive trust over unauthorised gains: commercial considerations
In FHR, the Supreme Court finally resolved the seemingly endless debate in English law concerning whether an agent held a bribe or secret commission received in breach of his fiduciary duty on trust for his principal. The answer given by the Supreme Court, in a unanimous judgment delivered by Lord Neuberger, was a resounding 'yes'. The state of English law before FHR was complex and unwieldy, with 200 years of inconsistent judgments and voluminous academic writing on the subject. 68 Yet, the answer to this question has important practical implications for the principal, most notably, with regard to the nature of injunctive relief available, the ability to invoke equitable tracing rules and priority in the event of the fiduciary's insolvency.
As a matter of principle, there are broadly two camps to the debate. Those in favour of proprietary relief generally base their arguments on the scope of the agency/fiduciary obligation, 69 treating the principal as being entitled to the benefits, whether authorised or unauthorised, received by the agent in the course of the agency. Detractors, on the other hand, champion the hard-nosed principles of property law that proprietary interests cannot arise over benefits that are not derived from the principal's assets. Investments, Lord Neuberger MR (as he then was, delivering the leading judgment) provided seven reasons-ranging from precedent, principle, policy and ill-considered reasoning-as to why Reid should not be followed and would not likely be followed by the Supreme Court.
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Lord Neuberger PSC's (as he now is) tergiversation in FHR, merely three years after Sinclair Investments, is, to say the least, unexpected: indeed, his Lordship has himself described it as 'a damascene conversion'. 81 Importantly, his judgment in FHR did not directly engage in principle, 82 notwithstanding his claim that it was a decision arrived based on both principle and practicality. 83 In fact, his Lordship went as far to say that the debate was one Singapore. 105 The objection against the recognition of a remedial constructive trust generally emanates from concerns of unconstitutional redistribution of property rights based on judicial discretion and the uncertainty of its operation being founded upon exercise of judicial discretion. 106 However, the same concern of 'redistribution of property rights' arises in respect of the Supreme Court's decision in FHR. Whilst explicitly rejecting the 'property law' camp of academic views on the debate for generating uncertainty, there was a tinge of equivocation in Lord Neuberger's reasoning. He said that 'in many cases, the bribe or commissions will very often have reduced the benefit from the relevant transaction which the principal will have obtained, and therefore can fairly be said to be his property'. 107 And whilst Lord Neuberger adopted counsel's argument that 'any benefit acquired by the agent as a result of his agency and in breach of his fiduciary duty is held on trust for the principal', 108 he seemingly did so largely because the simple answer is the right answer (following Occam's Razor). 109 For, if otherwise, his Lordship would not have considered the debate to be one with 'no plainly right answer'.
(b) FHR: Implications for Modern Equity
The lack of a clear conceptual basis for the FHR decision has profound implications for trust law. First, it is harder than before to identify a single unifying principle to explain why constructive trusts arise, 111 save for a rationalisation pitched at a high level of abstraction, such as 'unconscionability'. 112 Secondly, the FHR decision creates the possibility for courts to award proprietary relief in circumstances based on considerations of policy and practicality 113 -the emergence of legal realism that was not previously well received by English law. It is difficult to predict when a constructive trust will arise in a new set of circumstances. Thirdly, the interplay between proprietary and personal relief (account of profits) 114 for receiving unauthorised benefits in breach of fiduciary duty has been transformed. A consequence of FHR is the availability of proprietary relief in nearly every case. 115 Accordingly, the interplay between the two kinds of remedies is presently far less concerned with availability; it has instead become primarily concerned with election by the claimant.
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The infiltration of the fiduciary doctrine into the commercial world accentuates problems (taking of bribes and secret commissions) that are infrequently encountered in the domestic context. In one sense, FHR redirects our attention to focus on the severity of wrongdoing in crafting appropriate remedies, 117 116 A corollary consequence is that there is no longer the concern that the account is unable to 'mop up' all the unauthorised benefits that a fiduciary has derived from the breach of duty.
117 Although some may take the view that the effect of FHR is to accord equal remedial treatment to all breaches of fiduciary duty (see D Whayman, 'Proprietary remedy confirmed for bribes and secret commissions' [2014] Conv 518, 523-524), it should not be missed that where a fiduciary has acted in good faith, he may be awarded equitable allowance (see Boardman v Phipps [1964] 1 WLR 993). As such, it is certainly arguable that the real effect of FHR, mapped on to existing principles, is to craft remedies based on severity of wrongdoing.
context, in partnership with domestic statute and international influence. By affirming that a principal is entitled to assert a proprietary claim over benefits received by a fiduciary in breach of his loyalty (personal obligation), regardless of whether they are derived from the interference with the principal's property, English law has further blurred the divide between obligation and property. This brings to mind Worthington's argument a decade ago: 'equity, according to persistent commercial pressure, has effectively eliminated the divide between property and obligation, or between property rights and personal rights'. 119 To put it simply, evasively-appeared not completely averse towards proprietary restitution for mistake, in particular, as a possible, alternative basis for the outcome in Bailey. 128 His Lordship declined to consider the alternative mistake analysis 129 on the basis that it would go beyond the scope of the appeal; 130 and yet his Lordship's disapproval of Neste Oy was itself obiter, given the prior conclusion as to the agent's authority on the first point of the appeal.
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Such subtle (and partial) judicial tergiversation in the already troubled equitable waters further illustrates the Supreme Court's propensity for subjecting trust law principles to commercial dexterity-essentially, pick the explanation that supports the desired outcome. While the Supreme Court loathes the remedial constructive trust, it seems to practise a more disguised form of 'discretionary remedialism'.
Liability of Third Parties (a) Limitation
The final category of cases which we shall consider here concerns the liability of third parties or strangers to the trust. 132 In England, the Supreme Court addressed some key questions in respect of such claims in Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria, 133 which concerned an alleged sophisticated fraud on the claimant, whose claim was said by the defendants to be out of time. S 21 of the Limitation 1980, provides, so far as relevant, that:
(1) No period of limitation prescribed by this Act shall apply to an action by a beneficiary under a trust, being an action (a) in respect of any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was a party or privy; or (b) to recover from the trustee trust property or the proceeds of trust property in the possession of the trustee, or previously received by the trustee and converted to his use. … (3) Subject to the preceding provisions of this section, an action by a beneficiary to recover trust property or in respect of any breach of trust, not being an action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by any other provision of this Act, shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the right of action accrued.
By a majority (Lord Clarke dissenting on this point), the Court held that, both for purposes of limitation, and more generally, dishonest assistants and knowing recipients are not constructive trustees in a true sense. Rather, a stranger to the trust 'is not in fact a trustee at all, even though he may be liable to account as if he were'. 134 Additionally (Lord Mance dissenting on this point), in the particular context of s21(1)(a), an 'action in respect of any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was a party or privy', only refers to an action for breach of trust against the trustee (not to other actions which might more broadly be said to be 'in respect of' a breach of trust, such as dishonestly assisting a fraudulent trustee). This conclusion means that the six-year limitation period under s 21(3) applies to all claims against strangers to the trust, although, peculiarly, in that section 'in respect of any breach of trust' does include such claims. It also means that the nature of the trustee's breach does not affect whether a limitation period applies. The decision in Williams is less overtly based on commercialist reasoning than either AIB or FHR, admittedly: however, we argue that it fits the trend, not least in the light of subsequent cases. In particular, as we examine through a comparative angle in the next section, recent authorities from various common law jurisdictions on the liability of strangers to the trust demonstrate reluctance on the part of the courts to subject such parties (typically commercial actors who do not voluntarily undertake onerous equitable obligations) to extensive liability. 140 In particular, in addition to considering Australian developments, our analysis compares English law with the developments in other commercially-focused common law jurisdictions, such as Singapore and Hong Kong. The convergence of judicial attitudes within the common law world strongly indicates that English law is not alone in its commercialist treatment of equity.
(b) Standards for Liability
Williams was the first time in a decade that the Supreme Court (or House of Lords) had substantively considered either ancillary liability in equity. 141 The case was argued on the basis, which the majority Williams accepted, that the principles as to establishing the liability of strangers are largely settled, without interrogating some remaining uncertainties that go to the nature of liability. As cases from the English Court of Appeal and other jurisdictions show, other issues arising in the commercial context may well require consideration at the highest level in England again soon.
We deal with dishonest assistance first, and only briefly, since the nature of the liability is less controversial than that in knowing receipt. English law has had some struggles with the test for dishonesty, 142 but the law now appears to have settled on an objective test.
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It has been clear in England since the Privy Council decision in Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan 144 that there is no requirement for the trustee themselves to be dishonest. In Australia, however, the High Court insisted that an action does require there to have been knowing assistance in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustee or fiduciary.
Hasler v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd, 146 the New South Wales Court of Appeal disapproved a
Western Australian decision 147 which had been understood to have misinterpreted this criterion insofar as it related to the nature of the breach of the primary duty. In Hasler, the court refused to lower the standard for such claims in dishonest assistance: 'It is plain (in Australia) that it is the quality of the fiduciary's breach which must answer the description of "dishonest or fraudulent"' 148 The effect of the Australian position is to confine the potential for the liability of an accessory (who does not procure or induce the breach) to those breaches which are dishonest, 149 and thus to make the action's availability much more limited in commercial litigation than it would be in England.
The reluctance to expose commercial actors to extensive equitable liability can also be seen in Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk. 150 A full account of the decision in that case is beyond our scope here. But in the context of a claim in dishonest assistance in respect of a complicated bribery scheme, the Court of Appeal insisted on a special causation test which worked in favour of the defendant because he was not 'a true fiduciary'. 151 The Court went on to state that 'where a claim for an account of profits is made against one who is not a fiduciary, and does not owe fiduciary duties then… the court has a discretion to grant or withhold the remedy.' 152 The general approach in Novoship has since been endorsed by the Board of the Privy Council. 153 This retention of discretion fits with the trend we have seen for a measure of flexibility in judicial decision-making in the commercial context, and is also applicable in knowing receipt, to which we now turn. The case concerned the appropriate standard for judging whether it was justifiable for a Bank to have relied on an agent's apparent authority to act in a transaction. Lord Neuberger noted that 'at least when it comes to normal commercial transactions, the application of the concept of constructive notice, which is what Akai's approach effectively involves, has been deprecated' 159 and that
In a commercial context, absent dishonesty or irrationality, a person should be entitled to rely on what he is told: this may occasionally produce harsh results, but it enables people engaged in business to know where they stand. 160 an arm's length commercial context, I consider that, at any rate absent very special facts, equity would follow the law. 165 An application of these explicitly commercial considerations can be seen in the Singapore case of George Raymond Zage III v Ho Chi Kwong. 166 The Court of Appeal drew upon both
Akindele and Akai Holdings in addressing the consequences of a fraud by a solicitor on two of his clients. The fraudulent solicitor had then bought jewellery and precious stones from the defendant jewellery firm, buying in two batches -one in respect of the majority of the items, and then a second payment which was via a cash cheque identifying it as coming from a client account. That cheque was handed to a Mr Ho, who was a director of the jewellery and an experienced businessman.
The clients sought to claim against the jeweller in both dishonest assistance and knowing receipt. The action for dishonest assistance failed because the Court of Appeal was not satisfied that the jeweller had assisted in the breach by passive receipt of funds or that it was dishonest, though the latter finding was not properly explained. 167 The jeweller was held liable for knowing receipt of a portion of the proceeds. On knowing receipt, the Court cautioned that:
courts should be very slow in imputing knowledge of wrongdoing when assessing the propriety of commercial transactions. In the absence of established commercial practices or obviously questionable conduct on the part of a counter-party, merchants are not ordinarily expected to make searching inquiries into their customers' source of funds. To demand such diligence in the course of ordinary commercial transactions would unduly constrict trading activities.
168
In so holding, the Court delved into considerable detail on the nuances of the etiquette of jewellery purchases, and luxury goods more broadly. 169 This might be thought to be 'commercialist' reasoning on a relatively micro-scale, 170 not least because the Court stated that 'real estate transactions that might involve lengthy investigations into title and the existence of conflicting interests do not set normative standards in transactions for the sale and purchase of goods' (even 'for very large purchases').
The Court went on to note that the subsequent receipt of a cash cheque labelled as being from the firm's client account did give rise to the requisite level of knowledge to 'a sophisticated businessman ' 
Conclusions
Lord Browne-Wilkinson famously cautioned against 'the wholesale importation into commercial law of equitable principles inconsistent with the certainty and speed which are essential requirements for the orderly conduct of business affairs'. 178 Our argument has
shown that recent jurisprudence suggests that care should be taken in the opposite direction too. We have seen that the influence and impact of commercial (and Scots) rather than Chancery lawyers in part explains the revisionist creativity on display. The framing of issues is important: Lord Sumption, for example, began his judgment in Bailey -a case which, as we have seen, raised important questions about the law of constructive trusts -by stating that the appeal raised 'two important and controversial questions of commercial law'.
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It is important to be clear that the target of our criticism here is very much the tone and structure of the reasoning in the key authorities: it is perfectly possible to agree with the outcome of any one case without signing up to the route by which the court arrived at the conclusion. Nor is our argument that commercial considerations should be irrelevant to adjudication. Diversity of views can enrich the court's reasoning. As More noted in Utopia:
You are not obliged to assault people with discourses that are out of their road, when you see that their received notions must prevent your making an impression upon them: you ought rather to cast about and to manage things with all the dexterity in your power, so that, if you are not able to make them go well, they may be as little ill as possible; for, except all men were good, everything cannot be right, and that is a blessing that I do not at present hope to see.
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Our concern is rather with the demonstrable pattern in the cases of either subjugating the received notions of equity to commercial dexterity, or declining to engage with principle in the first place. Nor are appeals to commercial considerations always objectively ascertainable or verifiable. This commercialist flexibility comes at the expense of doctrinal coherence and a lack of development of equitable principles. Equity is being assaulted by commercialist discourse.
Our principal focus has been on the UK Supreme Court, and we have argued that next two rounds of appointments of Justices must recognise the need for Chancery experience, and the balance of specialist and generalist expertise. Importantly, there should not be any assumption that commercial experience is neutrally 'generalist'. Yet we have further shown that the 'commercialisation' of equity is not however a purely national revolution. And our argument has broader horizons, especially when one turns to examine the developments in jurisdictions that pride themselves as commercial hubs. In Hong Kong, there is a crosspollination of the law from the judges in England and Australia sitting in the Court of Final Appeal: the influence of these judges is notable in commercial/Chancery cases. 181 A wider, related issue is the extent to which the law, and the courts, in the various jurisdictions considered above are, and should be, sensitive to reflecting commercial reality and good sense, as a facet of being an attractive centre for the adjudication of international commercial litigation. 182 For example, Singapore's goal of developing its own indigenous law contrasts with the rise of the Singapore International Commercial Court 183 (which is part of the initiative to internationalise the local legal sector): disputes before the latter will usually be presided over by international judges. It remains to be determined the extent to which cases before the Singapore International Commercial Court will influence the development of Singapore law, but our analysis suggests that caution is needed. 184 Throughout this article, we have used 'commercialisation' and 'commercialised' as shorthand for commercial considerations, and perhaps the considerations of commercial lawyers influencing reasoning in equity here. 185 But we have also used it advisedly, with the implicit undertone of the potential commodification of law, in England and elsewhere.
At the heart of the debate concerning the modern development of equity, then, lies the important query of what the law of trusts is meant to do, and to be. After this dystopian revolution, a restoration of principle is needed. But such a restoration requires us to consider more deeply what are the old ways of equity that no longer suit the modern world, and which, if any, must be abandoned.
